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Tobler PN, O’Doherty JP, Dolan RJ, Schultz W. Reward value
coding distinct from risk attitude-related uncertainty coding in human
reward systems. J Neurophysiol 97: 1621–1632, 2007. First published
November 22, 2006; doi:10.1152/jn.00745.2006. When deciding be-
tween different options, individuals are guided by the expected (mean)
value of the different outcomes and by the associated degrees of
uncertainty. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to iden-
tify brain activations coding the key decision parameters of expected
value (magnitude and probability) separately from uncertainty (statis-
tical variance) of monetary rewards. Participants discriminated behav-
iorally between stimuli associated with different expected values and
uncertainty. Stimuli associated with higher expected values elicited
monotonically increasing activations in distinct regions of the stria-
tum, irrespective of different combinations of magnitude and proba-
bility. Stimuli associated with higher uncertainty (variance) elicited
increasing activations in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Uncertainty-
related activations covaried with individual risk aversion in lateral
orbitofrontal regions and risk-seeking in more medial areas. Further-
more, activations in expected value-coding regions in prefrontal
cortex covaried differentially with uncertainty depending on risk
attitudes of individual participants, suggesting that separate prefrontal
regions are involved in risk aversion and seeking. These data dem-
onstrate the distinct coding in key reward structures of the two basic
and crucial decision parameters, expected value, and uncertainty.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Every day we make decisions about which outcomes to pursue,
but we don’t even know how the brain processes the most simple
parameters that determine our decisions. Pascal (1948) used the
emerging probability theory to postulate a formal description of
decision-making. He conjectured that humans tend to choose the
option with the highest expected (mean) value of the probability
distribution of outcomes (expected value as sum of all probability-
weighted values of the distribution, the first moment of a distri-
bution). However, most realistic choices involve some degree of
uncertainty of the outcome, and individuals need to take the
uncertainty into account when making decisions. Uncertainty can
be expressed by the variance of the probability distribution (vari-
ance as sum of probability-weighted differences from expected
value, the 2nd moment). Variance reflects the spread of a distri-
bution and indicates how far each possible value is away from the
expected value. Variance is perceived as “risk” and refers to how
much the decision-maker is uncertain or risks to gain, not to gain,
or to lose relative to the expected (mean) value when the proba-
bilities are known (Kreps 1990; Real 1991). Probability by itself
is not a good, monotonic measure for uncertainty. For example, in
a two-outcome situation (reward vs. no reward), uncertainty is
maximal at P  0.5 and decreases toward higher and lower
probabilities as it becomes increasingly certain that something or
nothing will be obtained, respectively. Modern economic decision
theories, such as expected utility theory and prospect theory, build
on the basic terms of expected value and uncertainty and incor-
porate them into the scalar decision variables of utility and
prospect, respectively (Huang and Litzenberger 1988; Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Kreps 1990; Von Neuman and Morgenstern
1944).
Just as we need to understand the function of the retina
before investigating visual perception, we need to understand
the neural processing of expected value and variance that
constitute the most basic input variables for economic deci-
sion-making. As expected value is the summed product of
magnitude and probability, a neural signal for expected value
should reflect the product irrespective of its components. Pre-
vious studies report distinct neural signals for magnitude and
probability in striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (Breiter et al.
2001; Critchley et al. 2001; Delgado et al. 2003; Dreher et al.
2006; Elliott et al. 2003; Knutson et al. 2001, 2005; O’Doherty
et al. 2001; Volz et al. 2003) but without describing a common
signal related to expected value irrespective of the two com-
ponents (Tobler et al. 2005). The mathematical decomposition
of expected utility into expected value and variance (Huang
and Litzenberger 1988; Stephens and Krebs 1986) and the
variations in risk attitude among different behavioral situations
(Caraco et al. 1980, 1990) suggest that some brain structures
might process uncertainty separately from expected value.
Various brain structures appear to be engaged in situations
involving uncertainty. The altered risk sensitivity and gam-
bling in humans and animals after brain lesions suggest that the
orbitofrontal cortex is involved in processing information
about the uncertainty of outcomes (Bechara et al. 1994, 2000;
Hsu et al. 2005; Miller 1985; Mobini et al. 2002; Sanfey et al.
2003). The anterior cingulate is active with choice conflicts
during financial risk-taking (Kuhnen and Knutson 2005), the
amygdala, orbitofrontal, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are
engaged in ambiguous situations with unknown probabilities
(Hsu et al. 2005; Huettel et al. 2006), and the midbrain and
striatum are involved in the coding of variance combined with
magnitude or probability (Dreher et al. 2006) and in classifi-
cation learning (Aron et al. 2004). However, neural signals
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reflecting the simple uncertainty of reward well separated from
the coding of other decision variables such as expected value
have not been located.
M E T H O D S
Participants
Sixteen right-handed healthy participants (mean age: 27 yr; range:
20–41 yr; 8 females) were investigated. Participants were preassessed
to exclude prior histories of neurological or psychiatric illness. All
participants gave informed consent, and the study was approved by
the Joint Ethics Committee of the National Hospital for Neurology
and Neurosurgery (UK).
Behavioral procedure
Participants were placed on a moveable bed in the scanner with
light head restraint to limit head movement during image acquisition.
Participants viewed a computer monitor through a mirror fitted on top
of the head coil. To study the processing of economic parameters
independent of choice, subjects performed in a simple conditioning
paradigm in the scanner. We determined individual risk attitudes in a
separate choice task outside the scanner (see following text). At the
beginning of a trial in the main paradigm, single visual stimuli
appeared for 1.5 s in one of the four quadrants of the monitor.
Outcomes appeared 1 s after the stimulus for 0.5 s below the stimulus
on the monitor such that outcome and stimulus presentation co-
terminated. Intertrial intervals varied between 1 and 8 s according to
a Poisson distribution with a mean of 3 s. In each trial, we randomly
presented one of twelve visual stimuli, each predicting reward with a
specific magnitude and probability. We used four levels of reward
magnitude, which varied between 100 and 400 points in steps of 100,
and five levels of reward probability, which varied between P  0.0
and P  1.0 in steps of 0.25. The stimuli and the rewarded versus
unrewarded outcomes alternated randomly within the boundaries
defined by the probabilities (48 trials for P  1.0; e.g., 36 rewarded
and 12 unrewarded trials for P  0.75), thus producing a measured
mean of reward identical to the expected value. Throughout the
experiment, the total points accumulated were displayed and updated
in rewarded trials at the time of reward delivery. Four percent of the
total points were predictably paid out as British pence at the end of the
experiment.
The visual stimuli were specific combinations of attributes drawn
from two visual dimensions, shape and color, indicating reward
magnitude and probability, respectively. For example (Fig. 1B), four
orange circles could predict 400 points with P  0.5, whereas two
dark red circles could predict 200 points with P  1.0. Both stimuli
were associated with different combinations of magnitude and prob-
ability but the same expected value (200 points). We counterbalanced
the meaning of dimensions (shape or color of stimuli) and the
direction in which they changed (for shape: number of circles per
stimulus; for color: relative level of yellow or red) across participants.
Stimulus delivery was controlled using Cogent 2000 software (Well-
come Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) as imple-
mented in Matlab 6.5 (Mathworks, Natick, MA).
The first two moments of the 12 probability distributions associated
with the 12 respective stimuli were calculated according to the
following formulae: expected value (EV)  i (mi  pi); variance 
[i (mi EV)2]/n, which is equivalent to p (mi – EV)2 (1 p)
(0 – EV)2.
In the formulae, m is magnitude of reward, p is probability of
reward, n is number of elements (outcomes associated with each
stimulus), and i is index i 1 . . . n. Our probability distributions have
n  1, 2, or 4 elements for P  0.0 or 1.0, P  0.5, and P  0.25 or
0.75, respectively.
The conditioning procedure comprised a training and a testing
phase. In the training phase, participants learned the meaning of the
stimuli and how to perform the task while each stimulus was pre-
sented in eight consecutive trials. Earnings in the training phase did
not contribute to the monetary earnings of participants, but accumu-
lated points were nevertheless displayed. Participants were in the
FIG. 1. Experimental design and pleasantness ratings. A: behavioral task.
Single stimuli were presented randomly in 1 of the 4 quadrants of a monitor for
1.5 s, and participants indicated the quadrant in which stimuli appeared with a
button press. Stimuli were associated with different combinations of reward
magnitude and probability (see B). Reward consisted of points, 4% of which
was paid out as British pence to subjects at the end of the experiment.
Throughout the experiment, the total of points accumulated was displayed and
updated after reward delivery. Trial types alternated randomly. B: experimental
design. Twelve different stimuli were associated with different reward mag-
nitudes (ordinate) and probabilities (abscissa) as shown. Expected value of
stimuli (sum of probability-weighted magnitudes) is indicated below stimuli
and increases with distance from origin. We disentangled expected value from
magnitude and probability by associating different stimuli with the same
expected value but different combinations of magnitude and probability. C:
relation of expected value (EV) and uncertainty (measured as variance) to
probability. D–F: average change in pleasantness rating in all participants as a
function of magnitude (D), probability (E), and expected value (F; 16 partic-
ipants, error bars represent SE). The scale ranged from –5 (very unpleasant) to
5 (very pleasant). Table 1 shows absolute ratings before and after experi-
ment. G: sensitivity of change in pleasantness as function of risk attitude. Risk
attitudes were determined in independent choice trials (16 participants). Sen-
sitivity was determined as slope in pleasantness change against the variance of
the binary probability distribution associated with each stimulus.
1622 P. N. TOLBER, J. P. O’DOHERTY, R. J. DOLAN, AND W. SCHULTZ
J Neurophysiol • VOL 97 • FEBRUARY 2007 • www.jn.org
 o
n
 O
ctober 25, 2011
jn.physiology.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
scanner during the training phase while structural scans were taken.
Functional data were acquired in the test phase, comprising two
sessions, each with 24 randomly alternating presentations of each
stimulus. The task remained the same as during the training phase, but
outcomes contributed to total earnings. In both training and testing
phase, stimuli appeared in one of the four quadrants of the screen. The
quadrant of stimulus appearance varied randomly between trials.
Participants were instructed to press one of four buttons correspond-
ing to the spatial quadrant of stimulus presentation. If they failed to
press the correct button within 900 ms, the trial was aborted, a red “X”
appeared, and 100 points were subtracted from the accumulated
earnings. Error trials were repeated, and reported results correspond to
correct trials in the testing phase.
Data acquisition and analysis
Participants rated the pleasantness of visual stimuli before and after
the experiment on a scale ranging from 5  very pleasant to 5 
very unpleasant. We evaluated ratings statistically by repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA. An interaction analysis between trial type and time
(before and after the experiment) tested for changes in pleasantness
ratings induced by the conditioning procedure. In addition, we tested
preference of participants among two concurrently presented stimuli,
both before and after the experiment. Pairs of stimuli either had the
same or, in control trials, different expected value. The preference
tests served to assess risk attitudes within the range of magnitudes and
probabilities used. Participants chose between stimuli associated with
low and high uncertainty but the same expected value. Each time the
participant chose the more certain stimulus, the factor of risk aversion
increased by one, whereas choosing the more uncertain stimulus
decreased it by one (n  4 choices). A positive average factor
indicated risk aversion, a negative factor indicated risk-seeking, and a
zero factor risk neutrality.
We acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images
(EPIs) with blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast on a
Siemens Sonata 1.5 Tesla scanner (slices/volume, 33; repetition time,
2.97 s). Depending on performance of participants, 405–500 volumes
were collected per session, together with five “dummy” volumes at the
start of the scanning session. Scan onset times varied randomly
relative to stimulus onset times. A T1-weighted structural image was
also acquired for each participant. Signal dropout in basal frontal and
medial temporal structures due to susceptibility artifact was reduced
by using a tilted plane of acquisition (30° to the anterior commissure-
posterior commissure line, rostral  caudal). Imaging parameters
were: echo time, 50 ms; field-of-view, 192 mm. The in-plane resolu-
tion was 3  3 mm; with a slice thickness of 2 mm and an interslice
gap of 1 mm. High-resolution T1-weighted structural scans were
coregistered to their mean EPIs and averaged together to permit
anatomical localization of the functional activations at the group level.
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM2; Functional Imaging Labo-
ratory, London, UK) served to spatially realign functional data,
normalize them to a standard EPI template and smooth them using an
isometric Gaussian kernel with a full width at half-maximum of 10
mm. We used a standard rapid event-related fMRI approach in which
evoked hemodynamic responses to each trial type are estimated
separately by convolving a canonical hemodynamic response function
with the onsets for each trial type and regressing these trial regressors
against the measured fMRI signal (Dale and Buckner 1997; Josephs
and Henson 1999). This approach makes use of the fact that the
hemodynamic response function summates in an approximately linear
fashion over time (Boynton et al. 1996). By presenting trials in strictly
random order and using randomly varying intertrial intervals, it is
possible to separate out fMRI responses to rapidly presented events
without waiting for the hemodynamic response to reach baseline after
each single trial (Dale and Buckner 1997; Josephs and Henson 1999).
Functional data were analyzed by constructing a set of stick functions
at the event-onset times for each of the 12 trial types. Rewarded and
unrewarded trial types were modeled separately. The stick function
regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function (HRF). In separate time course analyses, we made no
assumptions about the shape of activations and used eight finite
impulse responses per trial, each response separated from the next by
one scan (2.97 s). Participant-specific movement parameters were
modeled as covariates of no interest.
The general linear model served to compute trial type-specific
betas, reflecting the strength of covariance between the brain
activation and the canonical response function for a given condi-
tion at each voxel for each participant (see Friston et al. 1994 for
detailed descriptions). The effects of interest (betas, percent of
signal change) were calculated relative to an implicit baseline.
Although the numbers of stimuli were counterbalanced during the
experiment, the numbers of rewarded versus unrewarded trials
varied due to the different reward probabilities. To compensate for
different trial numbers in the general linear model, we equalized
the weights of the less-frequent events by multiplication. Using
random-effects analysis, the relevant contrasts of parameter esti-
mates were entered into a series of one-way t-test, simple regres-
sions or repeated-measures ANOVAs with nonsphericity correc-
tion where appropriate. We used thresholding strategy as described
previously (O’Doherty et al. 2002, 2003). For each analysis, in a
priori brain regions identified in previous neuroimaging studies of
reward processing (O’Doherty et al. 2002, 2003), including stria-
tum and prefrontal cortex, we report activations above a threshold
of P  0.001 (uncorrected) with a minimum cluster size of 5
voxels in all participants. For time course plots, we also used
MarsBaR (Brett et al. 2002), making no assumptions about the
shape of activations, and applying eight finite impulse responses
per trial, each response separated from the next by one scan (2.97 s).
The dependent measure in time course plots is percentage signal
change measured within spheres of 10 mm around peak voxels.
Reported voxels conform to MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute)
coordinate space, with the right side of the image corresponding to the
right side of the brain.
R E S U L T S
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
investigate how human reward structures process expected
reward value separately from uncertainty. We used an orthog-
onal design that fully dissociated reward magnitude, probabil-
ity, expected value, and uncertainty. We used all-or-none
binary probability distributions in which the probability of
obtaining a reward varied between P  0 and P  1. Different
conditioned stimuli were associated with different reward mag-
nitudes and probabilities, and thus expected values as their
TABLE 1. Pleasantness ratings before and after training
Before
Training
After
Training
Magnitude
100 1.5  0.4 1.0  0.4
200 1.7  0.4 1.7  0.3
300 1.4  0.4 2.6  0.3
400 1.3  0.5 3.5  0.4
Probability
0 1.2  0.3 0.3  0.4
0.25 1.4  0.4 0.5  0.4
0.5 1.6  0.3 1.3  0.3
0.75 1.1  0.4 2.1  0.2
1.0 2.0  0.4 2.7  0.2
Values are means  SE.
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product (Fig. 1, A and B). Our aim was to investigate the basic
parameters as potential inputs to neural decision processes
rather than the decision processes themselves. Therefore we
used imperative situations in which we had full control over
these parameters rather than behavioral choices.
The general linear model used for data analysis comprised
separate regressors for the different stimuli associated with
magnitude, probability, expected value, and uncertainty. Sub-
sequent tests assumed that expected value-related brain activa-
tions covary with expected value without discriminating be-
tween different combinations of magnitude and probability that
yield the same expected value. To identify uncertainty-related
brain activations, the analysis assumed that uncertainty is
highest for P  0.5, where receiving or not receiving a reward
is equally likely, and decreases toward lower and higher
probabilities (variance as inverted U function of probability,
Fig. 1C). Consequently, brain activations reflecting uncertainty
would follow variance as inverted U function of probability.
By contrast, a straightforward value signal would covary
monotonically with the full range of probabilities from P 0.0
to 1.0 (Fig. 1C). The distinction between the inverted U and the
linear covariations with probability guided us in searching for
separate brain signals for uncertainty and expected value.
Previous neurophysiological studies guided our selection of
investigated brain structures. Dopamine responses covary dif-
ferentially with expected value and uncertainty (Fiorillo et al.
2003; Tobler et al. 2005). As fMRI primarily reflects afferent
inputs to an area (Logothetis et al. 2001) and as the main
projection areas of dopamine neurons are the striatum and
prefrontal cortex (Lynd-Balta and Haber 1994; Williams and
Goldman-Rakic 1998), we searched for striatal and prefrontal
regions showing differential relations to expected value and
uncertainty. We used the results from the linear regressions to
search for brain activity that increased phasically at the time of
conditioned stimuli when reward magnitude, probability, ex-
pected value, or uncertainty increased.
Behavioral performance
We measured the pleasantness of stimuli before and after
conditioning. Pleasantness ratings did not vary before con-
ditioning [ANOVA: F(1,11)  0.77, P  0.67; regression:
r  0.12, P  0.29] but did afterward [F(1,11)  10.01, P 
0.0001], as a function of magnitude and probability (for
both, r  0.55, P  0.0001; Fig. 1, D and E; Table 1). After
the experiment, pleasantness ratings were higher with higher
FIG. 2. Coding of reward magnitude and
probability in striatum. A: activation in cau-
date covarying with increasing reward mag-
nitude (peak at –12/2/6; Table 2, top). B: time
courses of responses to stimuli associated
with different reward magnitudes, averaged
across 16 participants. C: regression of aver-
aged activation on magnitude (16 partici-
pants). Activations are further averaged
across 2nd and 3rd (peak) time points shown
in B. D—F: same as A–C but with time
courses separated according to reward being
delivered or not. G: activation in ventral stri-
atum covarying with increasing probability
(peak at –10/4/4; Table 2, middle). H: time
courses of responses to stimuli associated
with different probabilities, averaged across
16 participants. I: regression of average acti-
vation on probability (16 participants). Acti-
vations are further averaged across 2nd and
3rd (peak) time points shown in H. J–K: same
as G–I but with time courses separated ac-
cording to reward being delivered or not. In
this and all other figures, the right side of the
image corresponds to the right side of the
brain and circles around activations serve as
visual aid.
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expected value (r  0.53, P  0.0001; Fig. 1F) but did not
vary within pairs of stimuli that had the same expected value
but different magnitude-probability combinations (t63 
0.14, P  0.89). Reaction time was significantly shorter
for the highest compared with lowest expected reward value
and showed weak negative correlation with probability (590
vs. 601 ms, t2368  2.3, P  0.05; r  0.85, P  0.08)
without changing significantly with magnitude. In separate
choice tests, stimuli with higher expected value were pre-
ferred more often following conditioning compared with
before (83 vs. 50%, t47  4.85, P  0.0001). Thus partic-
ipants discriminated the stimuli according to magnitude and
probability and combined these two parameters in a manner
that indicated they used expected value for choice prefer-
ences.
Preference tests in separate choice trials revealed that 6 of
the 16 participants were risk averse, 7 were risk seeking, and
3 were risk neutral [average preference factors (mean 
SE): risk averters 1.8  0.3; risk seekers 2  0.2; scale
ranging from 4 to – 4, see METHODS]. We measured the
sensitivity (slope) of pleasantness ratings to variance for
each participant and regressed this measure against individ-
ual risk attitude. We found a significant negative correlation
with risk aversion (Fig. 1G), indicating that the more the
participants were risk averse, the more they found uncertain
outcomes unpleasant. These results suggest that the pleas-
FIG. 3. Coding of different expected reward values in stri-
atum. A and E: stronger activations in caudate close to internal
capsule (A) and posterior striatum (E) to stimuli associated with
higher expected reward value (peaks at –8/12/6 and 16/6/4;
Table 2, bottom). B and F: time courses of increasing responses
to stimuli associated with increasing expected value, averaged
across 16 participants. C and G: regression of peak activations
on expected value (shaded areas in B and F, respectively). D
and H: dissociation of coding of expected value in areas shown
in A and E, respectively, from behavioral reaction time (data in
D and H replotted from C and G, respectively). Abscissas were
centered according to means of expected value and reaction
time and scaled to SD to facilitate comparisons. Differences in
regressions in D were insignificant for dorsal striatal region
shown in A, but regressions in H were significant for ventral
striatum shown in E.
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antness ratings according to variance reflected individual
risk attitudes.
Coding of expected value in striatum
To first locate activations reflecting magnitude and proba-
bility, we regressed responses to reward-predicting stimuli
separately against increases in these two parameters. We found
significant correlations with brain activity for both parameters
in caudate and ventro-medial putamen (Fig. 2, A and G).
Similar increases were seen in the time courses of activations
averaged across all participants (Fig. 2, B and H) and with
regressions of average activations onto magnitude and proba-
bility (Fig. 2, C and I). These correlations were similar when
the data were analyzed separately in rewarded and unrewarded
trials (Fig. 2, D–F and J–L). In addition, a medial prefrontal
region showed increasing activations only with probability but
not magnitude, as described before (Knutson et al. 2005).
Having established striatal regions coding magnitude and
probability, we aimed to locate striatal activations coding
expected value. We regressed brain activation against expected
value and found significant correlations in the medial and
posterior striatum (Fig. 3, A and E), which were also apparent
in the averaged time courses (Fig. 3, B and F). The activations
increased significantly with expected value (Fig. 3, C and G)
but not with variance (Fig. 4D). The inverse, decreasing
activations with increasing expected value, was not found in
the striatum (P 0.05). Regressions of brain activation against
expected value differed significantly from regressions against
reaction time in ventral striatum (Fig. 3H) but not in dorsal
striatum (higher activation with both expected value and
slower reactions; Fig. 3D). These data suggest separate coding
between expected value and the motivational effects associated
with increasing rewards.
Besides covarying with magnitude and probability, the cod-
ing of expected value would require that neural changes with
one parameter compensate opposite changes in the other pa-
rameter, such that activations with different magnitude-proba-
bility combinations resulting in the same multiplicative product
would be indistinguishable. In applying this test, we found
similar striatal activations for the same expected values result-
ing from different magnitude-probability combinations (Fig.
4A). For example, activations differed insignificantly between
stimuli predicting 100 reward points with P  1.0 and 200
points with P  0.5 (expected value 100 points), but activa-
tions were higher than for stimuli associated with an expected
value of 50 points and lower than for stimuli associated with an
expected value of 150 points. Despite the constancy for differ-
ent magnitude-probability combinations, the striatal regions
activated with expected value (Fig. 3, A and E) were sensitive
to individual variations in magnitude and probability (Fig. 4B).
Taken together, activations in the striatum seemed to combine
reward magnitude and probability multiplicatively into a com-
mon signal of expected value but were unrelated to variance.
As expected value covaries with both magnitude and prob-
ability, we found, not surprisingly, that the striatal region
coding expected value overlapped partly with regions coding
magnitude and probability (Figs. 2, A and G, and 4C). The lack
of coding of expected value in the larger, nonoverlapping parts
may be due to lack of sensitivity to one of the parameters or to
lack of multiplicative coding, an issue requiring further exper-
imentation.
In addition, a dorsolateral prefrontal region showed partly
overlapping coding of magnitude, probability and expected
value using the regression model but lesser coding when time
courses were plotted and when multiplicative combinations
were tested (Fig. 5). Parts of medial and orbital frontal cortex
showed graded coding with expected value in the regression
model (Table 2, bottom). Decreasing activations with increas-
ing expected value were found only in the insula.
Uncertainty coding in orbitofrontal cortex
To locate activations reflecting uncertainty separate from
expected value, we used the general linear model and tested
for changes in variance, separate from expected value,
across the full range of probabilities for two levels of
FIG. 4. Coding of expected reward value
irrespective of magnitude and probability in
striatum. A: striatal activation to different
pairs of stimuli with same expected value.
For each pair, peak activations differed insig-
nificantly (shaded areas) despite different
magnitude-probability combinations for the
same expected value (mean difference be-
tween activations within pairs 0.004% sig-
nal change, P  0.78). However, activations
varied across expected values (left to right;
ANOVA P  0.01). B: coding of magnitude
and probabilty in striatal region marked by
circle in Fig. 3A. Probability was constant at
P  0.5 for variations in magnitude, and
magnitude was constant at an average 150
points for variations in probability (mean of
100 and 200 points with equal numbers). C:
separate but partly overlapping striatal re-
gions that show increased activations with
increasing reward magnitude (r  0.98, P 
0.05), probability (r  0.99, P  0.01) and
expected value (r  0.90, P  0.05), respec-
tively. D: lack of correlation between striatal
activations and variance.
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magnitude (0 –100 and 0 –200 points, Fig. 1, B and C).
Variance followed an inverted U function across increasing
probabilities, whereas expected value increased monotoni-
cally with probability (Fig. 1C).
We found significant correlations of averaged brain acti-
vation with variance in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Fig.
6A), which occurred also in time courses (Fig. 6B). The
activations correlated with variance (Fig. 6C) but not ex-
pected value (Fig. 6D). We then aimed to relate the activa-
tions to risk sensitivity and regressed the goodness of fit of
uncertainty-related brain activation in all participants
against their individual risk attitudes. We found positive
correlations with risk aversion in lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(Fig. 7, A–C) and, significantly different, with risk-seeking
more medially (Fig. 7, D–F).
These data suggest that activations in orbitofrontal cortex
process uncertainty irrespective of changes in expected value.
Moreover, uncertainty coding appears to be differentially re-
lated to the risk attitude of participants in medial and lateral
orbitofrontal regions.
Combined coding of expected value and uncertainty in
prefrontal cortex
Whereas the results in the preceding text demonstrate dis-
crete coding of expected value and uncertainty, we aimed to
find brain regions that code both parameters in combination. A
region in middle prefrontal cortex showed increased activation
with expected value irrespective of risk attitude (Fig. 8, B, C,
FIG. 5. Coding of magnitude, probability and expected value in lateral
prefrontal cortex. Common and distinct increases in activation to stimuli
associated with increasing reward magnitude, probability and expected value
as indicated by different colors (r  0.84, P  0.09; Table 2).
FIG. 6. Differential coding of reward uncertainty but not expected value in
lateral orbitofrontal cortex. A: stronger activation to stimuli associated with
higher variance as revealed by general linear model searching for inverted U
relation of activation to probability (peak at –42/30/20). B: time courses of
increasing responses to stimuli associated with increasing variance, averaged
across 16 participants. C and D: significant correlations of average peak
activation with variance (C) but not expected value (D; shaded area in B).
TABLE 2. Areas more strongly activated by stimuli associated with larger reward magnitude, probability, and expected value
Hemisphere x y z
Z
Score
Magnitude
Striatum (caudate) Left 12 2 6 3.5
Striatum (posterior putamen) Right 18 6 2 4.1
Medial prefrontal cortex Right 12 36 36 3.4
Lateral prefrontal cortex Right 50 16 6 4.3
Probability
Striatum (ventral putamen) Left 10 4 4 4.0
Midbrain Right 18 18 12 3.6
Left 20 16 14 3.6
Posterior orbitofrontal cortex Right 18 18 14 4.7
Medial orbitofrontal cortex Left 2 48 12 3.4
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex Right 8 58 10 3.3
Left 4 64 8 3.2
Lateral prefrontal cortex Right 52 26 2 3.5
Right 28 42 26 3.4
Left 34 48 10 3.8
Expected value
Striatum (caudate) Left 8 12 6 3.9
Striatum (posterior putamen) Right 16 6 4 3.8
Orbitofrontal/inferior frontal cortex Left 30 34 0 3.4
Medial prefrontal cortex Right 14 46 18 3.3
Lateral prefrontal cortex Right 52 28 8 3.9
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F, and G). However, activations in the same voxels decreased
differentially with variance in risk-averse participants (Fig. 8,
D and H) but increased with variance in risk seekers (Fig. 8, E
and I). The difference in slope was statistically significant (P
0.0001). Using this same regression model, we found two other
prefrontal regions that showed selective uncertainty coding
depending on individual risk attitude in the voxels coding
reward value. An anterior superior frontal gyrus region showed
decreases with variance only in risk-averse participants (Fig. 9,
A–G), whereas a caudal inferior frontal gyrus region showed
increased activation with variance only in risk seekers (Fig. 9,
F–J), suggesting that different value-coding prefrontal areas
subserve the evaluation of risk depending on individual risk
attitudes.
D I S C U S S I O N
This study shows that the two basic economic decision
parameters, expected value and uncertainty of reward, were
coded in distinct structures of the human brain. The coding of
expected value involved the striatum and, to a lesser extent,
parts of frontal cortex. The responses covaried with expected
value irrespective of different combinations of magnitude and
probability, although some regions of striatum and frontal
cortex coded specifically only magnitude or probability. These
activations were unrelated to reward uncertainty. By contrast,
the coding of reward uncertainty as measured by variance
involved regions in the orbitofrontal cortex. Uncertainty re-
sponses correlated with individual risk attitudes without re-
flecting reward value. Although expected value and uncertainty
appear to be coded mostly separately from each other, some
prefrontal regions showed value-related activations that covar-
ied with uncertainty depending on individual risk attitudes.
Taken together the data suggest that crucial parameters for
reward-directed decision-making were coded in the prime
reward structures of the human brain.
The coding of expected value in some striatal regions oc-
curred irrespectively of different multiplicative combinations
of reward magnitude and probability. This was unlikely due to
insensitivity of these regions to magnitude or probability as
these regions showed increasing responses when these param-
eters varied independently (Fig. 4B). Neither was expected
value coding due to simple coincidence or conjunction of
magnitude and probability coding. To achieve expected value
coding irrespective of magnitude-probability combinations
would require closely matching response gains, so that re-
sponse reduction with one parameter is compensated by re-
sponse augmentation with the other parameter. Unmatched
gains for magnitude and probability responses would not lead
to unchanged brain responses when decrease in one parameter
together with increase in the other results in the same expected
value. The required matching of response gains for magnitude
and probability in regions in which both variables are pro-
cessed make the coding of expected value a remarkable
achievement of neural coding.
Apart from the activations reflecting expected value we
confirmed previous results indicating separate, regionally dis-
tinct relationships of striatal activations to reward magnitude
(Breiter et al. 2001; Delgado et al. 2003; O’Doherty et al.
2001) and probability (Dreher et al. 2006), with the exception
of a block design study that failed to find magnitude relation-
ships (Elliott et al. 2003). A previous study found covariations
with magnitude in nucleus accumbens but not with probability
or expected value (Knutson et al. 2005). However, that study
used an anticipatory delay between cues and outcomes in a
contingent action-outcome design including loss trials, which
may preclude direct comparisons with the present study. Thus
it had been unclear until now whether these separate reward
parameters might be coded in combination as expected value in
parts of the human brain and specifically in the striatum. The
present results suggest that fMRI activations reflecting reward
magnitude, probability, and expected value occur in separate
striatal regions and well separated from uncertainty coding.
Activations in ventromedial prefrontal regions increased
with reward probability. Previous imaging studies found also
no relation of medial prefrontal responses to variations in
reward magnitude, irrespective of probability being kept con-
FIG. 7. Relation of uncertainty-related orbitofron-
tal activations to individual risk attitudes. A–C: co-
variation in lateral orbitofrontal cortex with increasing
risk aversion across participants (peak at 36/46/16).
The contrast estimates (betas) of individual partici-
pants are regressed against risk aversion in B and
compared by averaged bar plots in C (P  0.001;
unpaired t-test in 7 risk seekers and 6 risk averters).
D–F: covariation in medial orbitofrontal cortex with
risk-seeking ( inverse relation to risk aversion; peak
at –10/52/2). E and F: risk correlations in analogy to
B and C. Abscissa shows risk aversion as expressed by
preference factors (4 most risk-seeking, 4 most
risk aversion). To obtain these graphs, we correlated
the uncertainty-related activations to individual risk
attitude in 2 steps. First, we determined in each partic-
ipant the contrast estimates (beta) reflecting the good-
ness of fit between the brain activations and the uncer-
tainty defined by the 5 probabilities used (variance as
inverted U function of probability). Then we regressed
the obtained contrast estimates (beta) of all participants
to their individual risk preference factors assessed be-
haviorally and searched for brain areas showing posi-
tive (A) or negative correlations (D). We visualized the
correlations with risk aversion by plotting the regres-
sions with the betas in B and E.
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stant or varied (Knutson et al. 2003, 2005). These results
together suggest a preferential relation of ventromedial pre-
frontal activation with reward probability rather than magni-
tude. The preferential ventromedial prefrontal coding of re-
ward probability contrasts with the distinct relationships to
both reward magnitude and probability in the striatum. Thus
our findings confirm that some reward structures process the
basic reward components of magnitude and probability sepa-
rately. It would be interesting to ask what the function of such
independent coding might be. In the St. Petersburg Paradox,
individuals typically refuse to pay all their finite possessions
for options associated with infinite magnitude and expected
value, but at near-zero probability (Bernoulli 1954). Thus they
remain sensitive to independent variations in the components
of expected value, and the presently observed separate coding
of probability and magnitude may support such sensitivity.
The short trial duration of 1.5 s might have compromised the
separation of activations in relation to the cues and rewards.
However, we analyzed rewarded trials separately from unre-
warded trials and found comparable results. The separations
suggest that the observed relationships to reward magnitude,
probability, and expected value reflect predominantly re-
sponses to the specific cues rather than the rewards. The similar
activations in rewarded and unrewarded trials would rule out
major contributions of reward prediction error coding that
should differ across the different degrees of positive and
negative reward prediction errors in probability schedules (Mc-
Clure et al. 2003; O’Doherty et al. 2003). Despite the motivat-
ing influences of expected value on behavioral reaction times,
we found no correlation of expected value coding to this
behavioral parameter, suggesting that the activations did not
reflect simple motivational factors suggested to play a role in
reward processing in monkey premotor cortex (Roesch and
Olson 2003). Although penalty and perception of outcome
control can influence striatal reward processes (Tricomi et al.
2004), our experiments held these variables constant and the
described activations should not be due to them.
Phasic responses of dopamine neurons are consistently
stronger to stimuli associated with higher reward magnitude,
probability, and expected value (Fiorillo et al. 2003; Tobler et
al. 2005). Conversely, striatal output neurons show equal
proportions of both increasing and decreasing responses during
expectation and receipt of increasing reward magnitudes
(Cromwell and Schultz 2003), although probability and ex-
pected value remain to be investigated. The striatum forms the
primary target region of dopamine projections (e.g., Lynd-
Balta and Haber 1994), and hemodynamic responses measured
by fMRI primarily reflect input activity (Logothetis et al.
FIG. 8. Combined coding of reward value
and uncertainty. A: middle prefrontal region
showing significant correlation with a differen-
tial expected value-variance model (peak at 32/
44/10). The model assumed covariation with
expected value and variance (1st level) and in
addition positive covariation with expected
value and higher variance-coding slopes for risk
seekers compared with risk averters (2nd level).
B and C: correlations of signal change with
expected value separately for 6 risk-averse par-
ticipants and 7 risk seekers. The difference in
slope was not significant (P  0.47). D and E:
significantly different correlations of signal
change with variance depending on risk aversion
(6 participants; D) or risk seekers (7 partici-
pants; E) as assessed by behavioral preferences.
Individual data points in b-e are from peak
changes of responses (shaded areas in F–I). F
and G: time courses of activations with expected
value in 6 risk-averse participants (F) and 7 risk
seekers (G). H and I: time courses of activations
with variance in 6 risk-averse participants (H)
and 7 risk seekers (I).
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2001). Accordingly, the presently observed increasing magni-
tude-related striatal activations resemble more closely possible
inputs from dopamine neurons rather than local striatal activ-
ity. Moreover, the similarity between the currently observed
striatal activations and phasic dopamine responses extends to
probability and expected value. It is thus conceivable that the
observed striatal activations are partly driven by dopaminergic
inputs, although dilatory effects on the vascular system (e.g.,
Hughes et al. 1986) cannot be entirely excluded. In addition,
nondopaminergic inputs to the striatum or intrinsic computa-
tions within the striatum might be responsible for the nonho-
mogeneous, differential coding of magnitude and probability
separate from expected value.
A major current finding consists of separate regions in the
striatum and lateral orbitofrontal cortex that show distinct
activations with expected value and uncertainty. Expected
value and uncertainty of choice options are important param-
eters that determine behavioral preferences. They often vary
independently when individual risk attitudes change over sit-
uations and time (Caraco et al. 1980, 1990; Stephens and Krebs
1986). It is therefore advantageous for agents to have an
independent neuronal representation of both to choose accord-
ing to individual risk preference while retaining sensitivity to
variations in expected value. Thus by independently represent-
ing expected value and uncertainty, the currently observed
striatal and orbitofrontal activations could make independent
contributions to decisions involving risky choices.
The presently observed orbitofrontal activations with uncer-
tainty relate well to the behavioral alterations in risky situations
induced by lesions in orbitofrontal cortex (Bechara et al. 1994,
2000; Hsu et al. 2005; Miller 1985; Mobini et al. 2002; Sanfey
et al. 2003). Our findings may also help to explain the altered
orbitofrontal activations during risky decisions in drug addicts
(Bolla et al. 2005; Ersche et al. 2005). The present results do
not necessarily exclude a role of the striatum in coding uncer-
tainty at longer time scales than tested presently. Dopamine
neurons show a slower, more sustained uncertainty signal
(Fiorillo et al. 2003) that might induce striatal uncertainty-
related activations (Aron et al. 2004). Other regions coding
uncertainty could include the posterior cingulate and parietal
cortex (Huettel et al. 2006; McCoy and Platt 2005), although
the present study failed to find substantial uncertainty-related
activations in these regions.
The lateral orbitofrontal cortex showed stronger uncertainty-
related activity with increasing individual risk aversion,
whereas medial orbitofrontal activations correlated with in-
creasing risk-seeking. Thus uncertainty responses are differen-
tially modulated by individual risk attitudes in the two orbito-
frontal regions. Individual risk attitudes are crucial in deter-
mining the utility of uncertain rewards. Expected utility theory
postulates that the utility of a reward decreases with increasing
uncertainty for a risk-averse individual but increases for a risk
seeker. The negative and positive influences of uncertainty
increase with increasing degrees of individual risk-avoiding
and -seeking behavior, respectively. The differential orbito-
frontal relationships of uncertainty coding to individual risk
attitudes may contribute to the varying influences of uncertain
rewards on utility for the individual decision maker.
Different prefrontal regions showed different forms of com-
bined coding of expected value and variance. Taylor series
expansion suggests that the expected utility of an option can be
approximated by its mean and variance (and additional higher
moments) (Huang and Litzenberger 1988; Stephens and Krebs
1986). As a consequence, expected value and uncertainty can
separately influence the expected utility of an outcome. Risk-
averse individuals aim to maximize expected reward value as
well as minimize variance, whereas risk-seekers tend to max-
imize both expected value and variance. A variety of species,
such as bumblebees (Real et al. 1982) and juncos (Caraco and
Lima 1985), are sensitive to both expected value and variance.
The present activations directly reflect the influence of indi-
vidual risk attitude on uncertainty coding in voxels that also
G
I
B
F
A
D
H
J
C
E FIG. 9. Reward value coding combined with differen-tial uncertainty coding according to individual risk atti-
tude. A–E: differential prefrontal uncertainty coding in
risk-averse participants. A: region in superior frontal
gyrus showing selective decreased activation with vari-
ance in 6 risk averters without variance coding in seven
risk seekers (peak at 18/62/10). B–E: correlations of
signal change with expected value and variance. F–J:
differential prefrontal uncertainty coding in risk-seeking
participants. F: region in inferior frontal gyrus showing
selective increased activation with variance in 7 risk
seekers without variance coding in 6 risk averters (peak at
48/22/8). G–J: correlations of signal change with ex-
pected value and variance. Same regression model for A
and F as used for Fig. 8.
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show expected value coding, both for risk averters and risk
seekers. Although these activations may involve separate indi-
vidual neurons, the close proximity of value and uncertainty
coding may suggest an involvement of prefrontal cortex in the
computation of an integrated expected utility signal. The se-
lective influence of individual risk aversion on decreasing
uncertainty coding contrasts with the selective influence of risk
seeking on positive uncertainty coding in a different prefrontal
region and may suggest that activations in different prefrontal
regions underlie the pronounced differences between risk
averters and risk seekers in choice preferences involving un-
certain outcomes.
In conclusion, we show that reward structures of the human
brain separately encode basic microeconomic reward parame-
ters. Specifically, the striatum carries rather distinct represen-
tations of reward magnitude, probability, and expected value.
Separate activations in the orbitofrontal cortex increase with
reward uncertainty and correlate with individual risk attitudes.
The data suggest largely distinct contributions of reward struc-
tures to the coding of value and uncertainty of reward-predict-
ing stimuli. The particular prefrontal activations combining
expected value and uncertainty into a single response may
provide the basis for an expected utility signal. Thereby the
presently observed activations may serve as a basis for eco-
nomic decision-making.
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